THE SKEPTIC'S PARADOX

Tonelli considers the best way of approaching the question of free will in this short philosophical essay.

The concept of free will has long been one of the thorniest topics in philosophy. Those who believe in its existence see it as an essential—even foundational—aspect of what it means to be human. Free-will skeptics, on the other hand, suggest it is merely an illusion masking the unavoidable and unintentional physical, chemical, and neurological processes that govern our behavior. With this short essay, the author wades thoughtfully into the fray, arguing that the difference between a universe in which free will exists and one in which it doesn’t may not amount to very much. This is due to what Tonelli calls the Skeptic’s Paradox: Whether we technically have free will or not, it certainly feels like we do. “Even if you don’t believe free will is real,” he writes, “you can’t escape the burden of making your own choices.” While this sentiment might seem like a dodge, or even an outright dismissal of the skeptical position, the author does not mean it that way—indeed, he generally aligns himself with the skeptical end of the debate. Rather, Tonelli aims to use this paradox as a starting position in his approach to the topic and to address how we might think differently about our own free will—and ourselves in general—given the possibility that we might not possess it. He uses the example of a diner deciding to order chicken rather than beef at a restaurant as a means of demonstrating various models of free will, each considered in terms of how external forces might exert some control over the decision. Is the choice based purely on the desire of the diner (intentional free will)? Is it truly possible for them to order beef (libertarian free will)? Does a certain degree of randomness mean they might order the chicken or beef without inherent preference for one or the other (stochastic free will)? Could they order chicken in this universe but beef in another (metaphysical free will)?

Tonelli explores these and other intriguing concepts (probabilistic versus deterministic causation, emergent free will) on the path to his ultimately nuanced conclusion. Along the way, he describes his ideas in clear prose using accessible metaphors to illustrate his concepts: “We are all aware of things [we] would do differently if we had the chance to live again,” he writes. “But wishing you had been a little wiser when you got into that fight with your spouse, is like wishing you had been a little taller when you tried out for the basketball team—yes, it would have helped back then, but it doesn’t help now.” The text is a quick read at less than 100 pages, and the facility with which Tonelli presents the argument’s landscape should delight even those readers who ultimately disagree with the author’s conclusions. Tonelli embraces uncertainty, happy to explore the many pockets between various positions, and he cheerfully invites his readers to do the same.

A revelatory and concise primer on the free-will debate.